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ABSTRACT: This paper assesses the impact of institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance on corporate system of firms using survey questionnaire based on international 
corporate governance norms. Data were collected from listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and 
South Africa. The conclusions are follows: (1) In Ghanaian and South African firms show 
that regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate governance have a positive 
significant impact on corporate governance system. However, in Nigerian firms’ regulatory 
framework has a negative significant relationship with corporate governance system. This 
result suggests that in Ghanaian and South African firms’ regulatory frameworks and 
enforcement may be stronger than that in Nigerian firms. (2) In Nigerian firms, there are 
violations of minority shareholders right. (3) Ownership concentration is significant with 
corporate governance system in the region. This indicates that ownership concentration is 
prevalent in firms of Sub-Saharan African Anglophone countries. We recommend that there 
should be prudent monitoring of corporate governance rules and enforcement.  
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Background of Study 
The issue of corporate governance continues to receive a high level of attention as a result of 
a series of corporate scandals that occurred in different parts of the world in the early part of 
this decade such as Adelphia, Enron, World com and XL holiday. Consequently, this has 
shaken investors’ faith in the capital market and the efficiency of corporate governance 
practices in promoting transparency and accountability. Since then, governments around the 
world have undertaken various measures to strengthen their regulatory framework in order to 
restore investors’ confidence and enhance corporate transparency and accountability 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, World bank 2002, OECD 1999).  
 
In developed countries authors such as Cadbury (1992) UK, Morck and Nakamu (1999) 
Japan, Georgen, et.al (2008) Germany, and Tam (2000) China have carried out various 
studies on corporate governance. The studies mention above have emphasised the importance 
of corporate governance but it is still unclear how these findings relate to sub-Saharan Africa. 
The differentiations may be as a result of corporate attitude, and enforcement of corporate 
governance policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. This study used a survey 
questionnaire with questions based on international corporate governance norms from Okpara 
(2010), Burton et al. (2009) and literature from corporate governance. 
 
This study therefore used empirical evidence to identify views about the importance of each 
component of corporate governance practice of listed firms in the sub-region.  The research 
question that this study addresses includes the identification of the components that are 
important for good corporate governance of listed firms in the sub-region. This is because 
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despite the issue of code of corporate governance practices by regulatory bodies of each 
country in the region, there have been a scandal among the board of directors and collapse of 
firms such as Cadbury Plc in Nigeria.  
 
Furthermore, in the banking industries in Ghana and Nigeria in recent times, the Bank of 
Ghana and  Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) sacked some board of directors of banks as a 
result of gross insider abuse, mismanagement of funds and this led to consolidation, merger 
and acquisition of these banks (SEC,2011).  Thus, the purpose of this paper is to fill this gap 
as much as possible by identifying the impact of institutional characteristics (such as 
regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholders rights and 
ownership concentration) of corporate governance on corporate governance system. 
 
The scope of this study covers listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. These 
countries are English speaking countries and their selection is based on a regional approach, 
which gives a wider scope. In addition, these countries have growing and strong economies 
with large markets. For instance, Ghana with the fastest growing economy in the sub-region 
after the discovery of crude oil, South Africa which  is the strongest economy in the sub-
region and Nigeria having a huge population and large markets, blessed with abundant 
natural resources such as  crude oil and land fertile  for  agriculture.   
 
The findings from this study make a contribution to the literature that enforcement, disclosure 
and transparency are likely to improve corporate governance system in all the countries 
together. In addition, there is a positive significant relationship between the regulatory 
framework and enforcement of corporate governance in each country such as Ghana and 
South Africa.  
 
Another contribution of this study is that in Nigerian firms, regulatory framework has a 
significant negative effect on corporate governance system. This finding seems to be due to a 
lack of proper implementation of regulatory framework of corporate governance by the 
institutional bodies such as Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). Moreover, lack of proper 
implementation may possibly be as a result of corruption among the officials of institutional 
bodies. Furthermore, there are laws in the books and laws in practice, however in Nigeria 
there are laws in the book for regulatory framework and enforcement policy of corporate 
governance but there are no laws in practice to execute those rules and regulation and 
enforcement of corporate governance practices. The institutional bodies and corporate 
governance system may look good on papers but when they are compromised with 
corruption, lack of implementation and incompetence the result is likely weak corporate 
governance practices among firms in Nigeria. 
 
We find that in Nigerian and Ghanaian firms’ larger concentration of ownership and 
preferential treatment to large shareholders may have influence on rules and laws of 
corporate governance practices. The implication is that ownership concentration is prevalent 
in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone firms. The rest of this paper are section two which is the 
literature review, section three methodology, section four is illustrate as finding of the study, 
section five and six show the conclusion and recommendation of the study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The level of legal protection of investors in any country is an important factor in determining 
the development of the financial market of company in that country. The systematic 
differences in structure of law and enforcement among various countries in area of historical 
trend of their laws, level of corruption, and the quality of their enforcement will surely 
determine the difference in financial development. As a result, these are the findings of 
authors toward the study of legal protection and enforcement in corporate governance of 
different countries. 
 
La Port. et.al (1998, 2008) posited that countries which their legal systems have origin in 
common law are more substantial shareholder protection than civil-law system. Also the 
authors claimed that greater shareholder protection increase the level of stock market 
development. In addition, Armour et.al (2009) revealed the same finding that common law 
system exhibits a higher level of shareholder protection than civil-law system. La Porta et al. 
(1998) examined the legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors.  
 
OECD (2004) explained the important of legal regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement 
agencies so that corporate governance framework will be effective in a firm. The organisation 
revealed that corporate governance framework should enhance transparency, consistent with 
rule of law, and there should be division of responsibility for supervisory regulator and 
enforcement agency in each country in which the firm operate. Each of the country must 
make sure that there is no conflict between the codes. The principles also suggest that 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities must have the power, integrity, and 
resources needed to carry out their duties in a professional and objectives manner. However 
the rulings of these authorities should always be at appropriate time, transparent, and should 
be explain clearly.  
 
In addition, ECA (2002) explained that separating the government’s policy making and 
regulatory roles through establishing independent regulatory mechanisms and increase the 
development of regulatory expert can enhance the stability in the regulatory environment. 
Also Rossouw (2005) posited that lack of an effective legal and regulatory framework hinder 
good corporate governance, this prevent  firms from listing because they are under highly 
scrutiny and they need to increase their level of disclosure. However, the author further 
explained that a legal framework is compulsory so that it can offer sufficient incentives for 
firms to become more transparent.   
 
OECD (2004) explained that corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters pertaining to the company. This includes 
the financial situation, performance, ownership, merger and acquisition and governance of 
the company.  
 
Moreover, OECD (2004) specified the following as the basic shareholder rights. This include 
the right to secure method of ownership registration, convey or transfer share, obtained 
relevant and material information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis. The 
organisational also revealed that corporate governance should ensure equitable treatment of 
all shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posited that ownership concentration is link with 
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legal protection as one of the main element for determinant of corporate governance. Thus, 
ownership concentration can be viewed as a governance mechanism. 
 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
 
This section describes the data instrument and source of the instrument, and explains the pilot 
study. Also focuses on the data collected by a survey questionnaire from the stakeholders of 
corporate governance of listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
The source of data instrument 
The instruments used to collect the data for this study was a survey questionnaire derived 
firstly, from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development principles of 
corporate governance in the 2004 OECD  which has been assessment instrument for Okpara 
(2010), also from  Burton et.al (2009). Secondly, from various corporate governance 
literatures, and in order to make sure that the data instrument is not subjective. This study 
modified the data assessment instrument so that it is tailored toward codes of best practices of 
corporate governance in Nigeria and guidelines of corporate governance practice in Ghana. 
Also, the King I, II, III Report of corporate governance in South Africa was considered in the 
data instrument. As a result, the institutional frameworks for corporate governance for Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa are all formulated from OECD principles of corporate governance. 
The above countries received their independence from Britain and the companies’ laws are 
derived from British common law. Consequently, the rules, laws and legal systems for each 
of these countries are considered in the data assessment instrument. 
 
The reason for using questionnaire is that there is lack of information on corporate 
governance variables in developing region such as Africa. The finding of this study could 
reveal the reality of the situation in those countries selected (Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa). The limitation of using questionnaire method is that the finding from the respondents 
is an opinion about what is happening on the issues of corporate governance of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone countries. Also the respondents may not be questioned or 
probed. In addition, there is a level of researcher imposition, this implies that when 
developing the data instrument (survey questionnaire), we may be making our own 
assumption as to what is important and not important. Thus the researcher may be missing 
something that is of important. 
\ 
These statements or items above (items) are based on a liker scale of five-point (1=strongly 
disagree to 5= strongly agreed.). The reason for using this scale is to measure intensity of 
feeling about the area in question. The justification of choice five liker scales is based on 
Bryman (2007) who posited that five liker scales is important because it enables the 
respondents to express their level of agreement with the statement in the question effectively.   
In addition, five point liker scale format provides five response alternatives which give more 
flexibility and also provides a measure of intensity, extremity and direction. To allow all the 
items or variables to be in one direction the negatively worded item are re-worded such that if 
is equal= 1 it is now 5, 2 now 4, 3 is still 3, 4 now 2 and 5 is 1. The items or statements in 
these sections are not in the same direction because there is need for the respondents to think 
very well before they tick the option in the survey questionnaire and this will not allow them 
thick those questions in one way. This happened under regulatory framework in section C, 
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shareholders rights in section F and section G which consist items for the role and 
responsibility of firm’s boards of directors in the survey questionnaire. 
 
Pilot study 
Generally in a quantitative research study such as   survey questionnaire, prior to the time of 
using this survey questionnaire to collect the data there is a need to conduct a pilot study.  In 
addition, Saunders et.al (2012) revealed that prior to using a questionnaire to collect data, it 
should be piloted tested. Firstly, the purpose of the pilot test is to refine the questionnaire so 
that respondents will have no problem in answering the questions. Secondly, to ensure that 
there is no problems in recording the data and to obtain some assessment of the questions’ 
validity and reliability of the data that will be collected so that the research question will be 
answered. Through pilot study validity and reliability can be measured in order to make sure 
that the survey questionnaire actually represents the reality what the study is to measure. In 
making sure the scale of the study is reliable we checked the reliability of the scale by 
checking the internal consistency through Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and the result 
indicated 0.80 Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. Ideally, Pallant (2010) explained that 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of a scale should be above 0.7 . 
 
Thirdly, there is need for pilot study because it is a form of trial run for the survey 
questionnaire so that we can determine whether the questionnaire will be successful after 
collection from the respondents. Besides this, during the pilot study we are able to identify 
the time of completion of the survey questionnaire. This also includes the clarity of the 
instructions for the survey questionnaire (if there are any questions that are unclear or 
ambiguous). In addition, to identify the questions that are not easy to answer by respondents, 
the lay out and how attractive the questionnaire to the respondents.  
 
At the end of the pilot study alteration were made to the questions including adjustment to 
layout. The survey questionnaire works best with standardised questions that one can be 
confident with and interpret in the same way by all the respondents. As a result, the survey 
questionnaire tends to be used for descriptive or explanatory research such as opinion on 
issues in organisation and organisational practices. Against this background, a pilot study was 
carried out for the stakeholders of corporate governance who are legislators, regulators, 
academician, individual investors, institutional investors, accountants/auditors, executive 
directors and non-executive. 
 
Data Sources 
A survey questionnaire was administered through a stratified random sampling to 
respondents which comprise the following; legislators, regulators, academician, individual 
investors, institutional investors, accountants/auditors, executive directors, non-executive 
directors, company executives (CEO) company employees, judiciary/legal and other such as 
students.  
 
In Ghana out of 200 survey questionnaire administered to the respondents, 150 were received 
which indicates 75 percent response rate. There are thirty-four listed firms on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange (GSE). As a result, the respondents from this study are from more than 
twenty listed firms which include banking, mining, food and beverages, breweries, 
conglomerates, insurance, chemical and paints, textiles, agriculture, and petroleum 
(marketing). When I was in Ghana apart from visiting some listed firms, regulatory agencies 
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offices, l also visited secretariat of the Institute of Director (IoD) in Accra and they assisted 
me in filling the survey questionnaire.  
   
In the case of Nigeria, 400 survey questionnaires was administered to the categories of 
respondents and 320 was received, representing 80 percent response rate. In Nigeria, there are 
206 listed companies on Nigeria stock Exchange (NSE). The respondents from this study are 
up to 100 listed firms.  I was able to attend 20 Annual General Meeting (AGM) of listed 
firms; including an AGM of shareholders in Lagos and Abuja. This gave me the opportunity 
to distribute the survey questionnaire.  
 
In South Africa 100 survey questionnaire were administered to the respondents and 71 was 
received back, this representing 71 per cent response rate. The survey questionnaires were 
sent and received back by e-mail.  Some were sending and received back through postage. In 
addition, the South Africa embassy in Nigeria assisted in sending and receiving some of the 
survey questionnaires. The respondents for South Africa covered investors, academician, 
legal/judiciary, accountants/auditors, board of directors and company employees for some of 
the financial and non-financial listed firms.  Some of the regulatory and supervisory agencies 
were also covered.  
 
The data instrument for this study (survey questionnaire) was administered to firms in South 
Africa. The firms were in the banking industry, the mining industry such as diamond and 
platinum industry and some other manufacturing companies. The researcher ensured that 
each of the survey questionnaires reached the top mining industries and financial sectors 
because; the South Africa economy is based on mining, finance house and financial sectors.  
 
The Sample of the study 
The study uses a stratified random sampling method to collect the data from twelve 
categories of respondents who were stakeholders of corporate governance in the SSAA 
region. The instruments used are from modified version of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004) Okpara (2010), Burton et.al (2009) and 
corporate governance literatures. The data consist of 541 returned out of 700 survey 
questionnaire administered to the respondents, this give a response rate of 77.29 per cent. Out 
of the total of 541 respondents 150 respondents were   from Ghana, 320 from Nigeria, and 71 
respondents from South Africa.   
 
The dependent variable 
The variables are rules and law systems, agencies power, legal system and organised agencies 
structure. The total corporate governance system (Total_cs) is the addition of statements 
under this section is proxies as dependent variable. 
Therefore the Total corporate system is proxy as dependence variables can be expressed as: 
Total_ Cs= Rules_Law +   Agencie_Power +   Legal_system+ Agencies_ Organise  
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Table 1: Definition of the variables for section B: Corporate governance system 
Variable                       Statements 
  
Rules and Laws 
(Rules_cs8)   
There are adequate laws and rules that promote the practice 
of good corporate governance of firms in my country. 
 
Agencies power 
 (Agencies_cs9) 
The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have 
power, resources and authority to enforce compliance with 
laws and regulations and guideline on corporate governance              
Legal system) 
(Legal_cs10) 
A good legal system in my country of operation helps to 
improve the corporate governance of firm 
Agencies-
orgnise  
(Organise_Cs11) 
A well organised legislature and sound regulatory and 
supervisory agencies in place promote good corporate 
governance 
Total corporate 
governance 
system 
(Total_csQ8-11 
)       
This addition of all variables for corporate governance 
system of firms under section B of the survey questionnaire. 
 
 
The Independent variables 
The independent variables are the addition of all the sub-variables in each section from C to 
G  this includes the following below:  
Trfw_(Q12-16) is denoted as the Total variable for regulatory framework which is the 
addition of statements (12 to 16 sub-variables) under the regulatory framework in section C 
of the survey questionnaire. 
Tenfm_ (Q17-19) is proxy as Total enforcement variable which is the addition of statements 
(17 to 19 sub-variables) under enforcement of corporate governance in section D of the 
survey questionnaire. 
Tdis_(Q20-23) indicated as the Total disclosure variable, this is the addition of all variables 
from statements (20 to 23 sub-variables) which is under section E of the survey 
questionnaire. 
Tshrt_(Q24-27) is denoted as Total shareholders’ right variable which is the addition of all 
the sub-variables from statements (24 to 27) under section F of the survey questionnaire. 
Towc_(Q28-30) is represented as Total ownership concentration variables and is the addition 
of all sub-variables from statements (28 to 30) under section G of the survey questionnaire. 
Other control variables which is the country dummies indicating if the respondents are from  
Ghana (G), Nigeria (N) and the reference category being South Africa.  In addition, if the 
respondents are regulators. Finally, µi is the random error term which is independently and 
identically distributed. 
 
The model for the analysis of institutional characteristics on corporate governance 
system 
This equation (1) below examines the contribution which each aspect of corporate 
governance (Such as regulatory framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, 
shareholders rights and level of ownership concentration) makes to the corporate governance 
system. Thus for i-th respondent total corporate governance system of firm (Total_Q8-11) 
can be determined as follows: 
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1. Total_(Q8-11) = β0 +β1(Trfw_Q12-16) + β2 (Tenfm_Q17-19) + β3(Tdis_Q20-23) + 
β4(Tshrt_Q24-27) + β5(Towc_Q28-30) +β6(G) + β7(N) + μi     
This equations (2-6) below examines the contribution of each sub-variable under (regulatory 
framework, enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholder rights and ownership 
concentration) makes to the rules and laws of corporate governance practice. 
Thus for i-th respondent rules and law guiding corporate governance of firm (Rules_Q8) can 
be determined as follows for sub-variables under regulatory framework, enforcement, 
disclosure and transparency, shareholders rights and ownership concentration as it is 
indicated from the equation 2-6 below: 
1. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) +  β2(Dis_Com15)  + β3(Ind_Bod16) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi 
=Regulatory framework   
 
2. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) β4(G) + 
β5(N) + μi =Enforcement  
3. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + 
β4(MA_23)+ β5(G) + β6(N) + μi =Dis 
 
4. Rule_Q8= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) +β4(G) + β5(N) + 
μi =Shd. Rights 
 
5. Rules_Q8= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   + β3(G) + β4(N) + μi = Ownership 
Concentration 
 
The descriptive statistics on institutional characteristics of corporate governance variables 
This section presents the descriptive statistics (mean, and T-test) for corporate governance variables based on 
average per question for each section (group) in the survey questionnaire. The Table below illustrate the result of the 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 2: Showing descriptive statistic of corporate governance variables based on average per question for each 
group in the survey questionnaire  
 Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone region  
Variables      Code Mean T-test N 
Regulatory framework Trfw_(Q12-16) 2.53* -10.51 541 
Enforcement Tenfm_(Q17-19) 2.64* -10.60 541 
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_(Q20-23) 2.48* -12.47 541 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_(Q24-27) 3.34* 6.54 541 
Ownership concentration Towc_Q28-30) 4.28* 49.62 541 
Corporate governance system TCg_(Q8-11) 3.57* 21.04 541 
     
Ghanaian firms     
Regulatory framework Trfw_C 3.02 0.37 150 
Enforcement Tenfm_D 2.06* 11.75 150 
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Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_E 2.54* -6.26 150 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_F 3.17* 2.74 150 
Ownership concentration Towc_G 4.25* 22.85 150 
Corporate governance system TCg_styB 3.18* 4.50 150 
     
Nigerian firms     
Regulatory framework Trfw_C 1.99* -24.42 320 
Enforcement Tenfm_D 2.22* -15.00 320 
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_E 2.15* -19.44 320 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_F 2.40* -19.88 320 
Ownership concentration Towc_G 4.23* 41.51 320 
Corporate governance system TCg_styB 3.47* 17.16 320 
     
South African firms      
Regulatory framework Trfw_C 3.90* 11.32 71 
Enforcement Tenfm_D 3.52* -9.74 71 
Disclosure and Transparency Tdis_E 3.85* 10.09 71 
Shareholder rights Tshrt_F 3.39* 8.22 71 
Ownership concentration Towc_G 4.25* 15.26 71 
Corporate governance system TCg_styB 4.55* 32.65 71 
Note: This table reports the summary descriptive statistic for the variables of the study. The dependent variable is 
indicated as total corporate governance system which is represented by Total_cg is the addition of all the items or 
variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The Independent variables are regulatory framework is shown 
as total regulatory framework indicated by Trfw_C which is the addition of all items or variables under section C of 
the survey questionnaire, enforcement is illustrated as total enforcement represented as Tenfm_D which is the 
addition of all the items or variable under section D of the survey questionnaire, transparency and disclosure is 
shown as total disclosure and transparency is indicated as Tdis_E which is the addition of all items or variable within 
section E of the survey questionnaire, Total shareholder rights represented as Tshrt_F is the addition of all items 
under shareholders rights in section F, and  ownership concentration shown as Towc_G  is the total items or variable 
under section G of the survey questionnaire.  
 
* T-Test Indicate that the response is significantly different from 3 (Undecided) at 5% level of significance (1.96). SD 
is shown as standard deviation for each variable based on average per question for each group in the survey 
questionnaire 
*T-Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the number (μ-
3/SD/√n)
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RESULTS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTIC OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTIC OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA ANGLOPHONE COUNTRIES 
 
Table 2 shows the results of descriptive statistic on each country; there is evidence that South 
Africa firms have the highest mean value of corporate governance system (TCg_(Q8-11) has 
a mean value of 4.55 with with highest T-test value. This implies that the respondents agreed 
that there is effective corporate governance system of firm in South Africa. This also suggests 
that this may likely be as a result of the reforms that took place in South Africa on issue of 
corporate governance such as the King Reports (1994, 2002) which followed the international 
standard such as Cadbury report of UK and OECD guideline on corporate governance 
practices. 
 
 Nigeria firms have the lowest mean value for regulatory framework (Trfw_Q12-16) of 1.99 
with highest T-test value. This result indicates that the respondents agreed that the rules and 
regulations for regulatory frameworks are not followed. This implies that although there is 
code of best practices of corporate governance that is issued by regulatory agencies such as 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Insurance Commission (NICOM), Nigeria 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). 
However, there is lack of implementation of the rules and regulation, the institutional bodies 
that are established to regulate the firms on corporate governance practice lack competence, 
and officers responsible for implementation may be corrupt. In Ghanaian firms, the 
regulatory framework (Tfrw_Q12-16) mean value is 2.97; this is lower than that of South 
African firms. This result suggest that the regulatory framework of Ghana firms is not as 
strong as South Africa because there is no major reform  on regulatory framework of 
corporate governance  in Ghana in compared with South Africa. 
 
In Nigeria firms’ enforcement have lower mean value of 2.22 and that of Ghana firms is 2.06. 
This implies that respondents disagreed that there is enforcement of corporate governance in 
firms for these two countries. This may likely be as result of lack of implementations of rules 
and regulations, weak legal system, corruption, and the institutional bodies to enforced 
corporate governance are not competent to carry out enforcement of corporate governance. 
However, in Ghana and Nigeria firms the mean value of disclosure and transparency are 2.54, 
and 2.15 respectively, this indicates a lower value which mean the respondents disagreed that 
there is disclosure and transparency in their firm.  This may due to non-compliance and lack 
of implementation of code of best practices of corporate governance.      
 
Moreover, in Nigeria firms the shareholders’ rights is the lowest with a mean value of 2.40. 
The lowest mean value of shareholders rights in Nigeria firm indicate that on average 
respondents agreed that there no basic shareholders protection in Nigeria.  Shareholders have 
no voice in decision taking within firms this happen as a result of impediment for 
shareholders to influence decision of the firms. In addition, the descriptive statistic shows that 
the mean value of ownership concentration for each country such as Ghana firms is 4.25, 
Nigeria firms 4.23, and South Africa firms, 4.28 This implies that the respondents agreed that 
there is ownership concentration of firms in all these countries in Sub-Saharan African. This 
suggests that when there is large concentrated ownership the controlling owner will be 
unwilling to dilute their ownership, generally known as non-dilution of entrenchment.  
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Table 3: Provides the  descriptive statistic on corporate governance system of firms in 
Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries 
          Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Rules and Laws (Q8) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
 Sub-region 
(SSAA 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
2.17* 
1.70* 
4.46* 
2.33* 
 
 
-9.16 
-36.34 
21.21 
-13.32 
 
Agencies Power (Q9) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region 
(SSAA 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
2.14* 
3.51* 
4.46* 
3.26* 
 
-9.66 
8.52 
21.21 
4.76 
 
Legal system (Q10) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-
region(SSAA) 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
4.14* 
4.25* 
4.62* 
4.27* 
 
20.53 
27.61 
27.86 
39.39 
 
Agencies- org (Q11) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region 
(SSAA) 
 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
4.25* 
4.42* 
4.66* 
4.41* 
 
19.63 
36.81 
27.43 
46.85 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of 
significance (1.96). 
Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of 
the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
The findings from the above Table indicate that adequate and effective rules and laws that 
promote corporate governance of firms in Ghana are weak, as a result of low mean value of 
1.70 and high T-test of -36.34. The respondents disagreed that there are adequate and 
effective rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This evidence may be 
due to outdated Company law of 1963, Act 179 which many Ghanaian. Also, the power, 
resources and authority to enforce compliance with law and regulation and guideline of 
corporate governance by supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have a mean 
value of 2.14 and the respondents disagreed with the statement. Although, presently there is 
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no Code of best practices of corporate governance in Ghana, there is a guideline for corporate 
governance practices but respondents believe that there is the need for a code of corporate 
governance practice.   
  
The results indicate that adequate and effective law to promote corporate governance of firms 
in Nigeria have a mean 1.70. This suggests that for firms in Nigeria there is Code of 
corporate governance practices and Companied Allied Matter Decree (CAMAD) 1990. 
However, there is a lack of proper implementation of CAMAD and Code of best corporate 
governance of firms. The respondents believe that rules and laws are not promoting sound 
corporate governance practice. 
 
South African firms show the highest value of mean compared with Ghana and Nigeria. This 
result may be as a result of the past reforms carried out by South African government on 
corporate governance practices of firms such as the King Reports of corporate governance 
(1994, 2002). This Reports followed the international guidelines on corporate governance 
(norms) such as Cadbury report of UK and OECD guideline on corporate governance 
practices. 
Table 4: presents the descriptive statistic on regulatory frameworks of corporate 
governance of  firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries.  
        Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Stock market  (Q12) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
 Sub-region SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.83* 
3.90* 
2.11* 
3.36* 
 
-1.58 
15.78 
-8.93 
6.54 
 
 
Auditor appointment (Q13)  
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.34* 
3.85* 
2.14* 
3.20* 
 
-6.68 
14.34 
-7.25 
3.47 
 
Board nomination (Q14) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.79* 
4.07* 
2.07* 
3.19* 
 
-8.06 
19.9 
-8.43 
3.30 
 
Disclosure  (Q15) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.90* 
4.21* 
2.10* 
3.72* 
 
8.82 
23.53 
-8.82 
13.62 
 
Independent board (Q16) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.04* 
4.03* 
2.23* 
3.87* 
 
12.92 
21.18 
-7.10 
16.68 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of 
significance (1.96).Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide 
by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
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From the above Table, the result indicates that in Nigerian firms the T-test and the mean 
value for all the sub-variables under regulatory framework is very high.  This finding 
suggests that there may be weak regulatory framework in Nigerian firms which is likely the    
lack of proper implementation for code of best practice on corporate governance.   In Ghana 
and South African firms the mean values are not too high as compared to Nigerian firms. 
 
Table 5:  Illustrates the  descriptive statistic on enforcement  of corporate governance of 
firms  in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries.  
          Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Non-compliance (Q17) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
Sub-region 
(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
1.95* 
2.25* 
2.21* 
3.05 
 
-12.73 
-12.90 
   5.94 
   0.88  
 
Investor protection (Q18) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region 
(SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.19* 
2.23* 
4.14* 
2.41* 
 
-8.49 
12.75 
12.98 
-11.34 
 
Minority shareholder (Q19) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-
region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.05* 
2.20* 
4.11* 
2.47* 
 
-10.48 
-13.01 
10.39 
-9.78 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of 
significance (1.96).Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide 
by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
There is evidence from the above Table that respondents disagreed with statements or items 
of the survey questionnaire on enforcement of corporate governance of firms in Ghanaian and 
Nigerian firms. This provides   very low mean value as compared to South African firms 
except sub-variable non-compliance (Q17). This suggests that it is likely that enforcement of 
corporate governance is weak in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms. However, in South African 
firms the respondents agree that there are adequate investors’ protection and mechanisms for 
investigating the illegal treatment of minority shareholders within firms. This finding implies 
that although there are reforms of corporate governance in South Africa such as King Report 
1, 2 and 3.The issue of sufficient investigation of non-compliance with laws/regulations by 
enforcement agency need to be address urgently. 
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Table 6: Indicates the descriptive statistic on disclosure and transparency of corporate 
governance for firms in  Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries..  
    Variables Countries N Mean T-
stat. 
 
Insider Trading(Q20) 
 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.11* 
2.07* 
4.17* 
2.35* 
 
-8.26 
-17.51 
13.69 
-11.10  
Information Access (Q21) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
2.13* 
2.08* 
3.38* 
2.27* 
 
-9.27 
-17.88 
  2.67 
-15.16 
 
Auditor Independence (Q22) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
3.73* 
2.34* 
3.92* 
2.93 
 
 6.77 
-11.35 
  8.34 
  1.23 
 
Merger and Acquisition (Q23) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71                   
541 
 
2.17* 
2.12* 
3.90*
236* 
 
-8.33 
-15.14  
   8.82 
-12.20 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of 
significance (1.96). Test  
value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square root of the 
number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
The finding from the above Table show that the mean value for sub-variables on disclosure 
and transparency in Ghana and Nigeria is low However, in South African firms the mean 
value is higher.  This implies that the respondents believe that disclosure and transparency in 
Ghanaian and Nigerian firms are not really sound as compared to South African firms. This 
may be as a result of lack of implementation of disclosure and transparency in the code of 
corporate governance best practices for Ghanaian and Nigerian firms. 
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Table 7: Showing  descriptive statistic on shareholder rights  of firms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
             Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
 
Shareholder rights (Q24) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
2.79 
4.18* 
1.89* 
3.48* 
 
-1.68 
20.49 
13.55 
 7.70  
 
Shareholder violation (Q25) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
2.73* 
4.13* 
2.52* 
3.51* 
 
 -2.30 
21.28 
  -3.68 
  8.72 
 
Shareholder meeting (Q26) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71 
54
1 
 
2.53* 
3.71* 
2.20* 
3.17* 
 
  4.17 
11.24 
  -6.74 
  2.93 
 
Shareholder alignment (Q27) 
 
 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA) 
 
 
15
0 
32
0 
71                   
54
1 
 
2.73* 
3.66* 
2.14* 
3.17* 
 
  -2.36 
10.45 
  -7.79 
   2.97 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of 
significance (1.96).Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide 
by square root of the number (μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
Table 7 indicate that in Nigerian firms all the sub-variables under shareholders rights have 
high of T-test and mean value. However, in Ghanaian and South African firms the T-test and 
mean value are lower. This indicates that the respondents agree that there is lack of proper 
implementation of shareholder rights in Nigerian firms.   
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Table 8: Present the  descriptive statistic on ownership concentration of firms in Sub-
Saharan Africa Anglophone (SSAA) countries. 
Variables Countries N Mean T-stat. 
 
Ownership Composition 
(Q28) 
                                    
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa  
 Sub-region 
(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.35* 
4.20* 
4.39* 
4.37* 
 
24.31 
32.52 
15.02 
47.56  
 
Large Concentration 
(Q29) 
                                     
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region (SSAA 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.21* 
4.31* 
4.21* 
4.28* 
 
17.64 
29.29 
10.73 
36.31 
  
Preferential Treatment 
(Q30) 
                                         
Ghana 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Sub-region(SSAA) 
 
 
150 
320 
71 
541 
 
4.17* 
4.20* 
4.15* 
4.18* 
 
 13.65 
 28.62 
   9.89 
 31.55 
*T-test indicates that the response is significantly different from 3 (undecided) at 5% level of 
significance  
(1.96).Test value is equal to mean value minus 3 over standard deviation divide by square 
root of the number  
(μ-3/SD/√n).  
 
In Table 8 there is indication that all the variables under ownership concentration have a 
higher T-test for Ghanaian and Nigerian firms. While that of South Africa T-test is a bit 
lower. Generally, in each country the mean value is high. This result implies that for firms in 
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, there are a variety composition of ownership, preferential 
treatment of large shareholders and concentration of ownership. 
 
Results of the correlation analysis of the institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance of firms  
We present the correlation analysis of corporate governance variables of firms when for all 
the observation for the countries, and at country level for each country such as Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa.  
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Table 9: Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance of firms in SSAA region. 
Variables Code corp 
gov. 
systm. 
(1).  
Regulator
y 
Framewo
rk 
(2) 
Enforc
ement 
 
(3) 
Disc. 
&  
Trpy 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rght 
 
(5) 
Owners
hip 
Concent
ration 
(6) 
1 
Corporate 
gov. Sytm 
TCg(Q8-
11) 
1      
2.Regulator
y 
framework 
Trfw(Q12-
16) 
0.24** 1     
3.Enforcem
ent 
Tenfm(Q17
-19) 
0.46** 0.19** 1    
4.Disclosur
e and 
Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-
23) 
0.38** 0.68** 0.44** 1   
5.Sharehol
ders’ rights 
Tshrt(Q24-
27) 
0.14* 0.63** 0.20** 0.56*
* 
1  
6. 
Ownership 
concentrati
on 
Towc(Q28-
30) 
-0.02 -0.27** -0.26** -
0.34*
* 
-0.32** 1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristic of corporate governance of 
firms in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone region. 
This study provides empirical evidences using correlation analysis to show the effect of 
challenges of corporate governance on corporate governance system of firms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone region.  
 
Table 9 provides Pearson correlation coefficient result shows that regulatory framework has a 
significant positive correlation of 0.24 with corporate governance system. This result 
supports the hypothesis that stated that there is a relationship between regulatory framework 
and corporate governance system.In addition, enforcement has positive significant correlation 
of 0.46 and disclosure and transparency has positive significant correlation of 0.38 with 
corporate governance system. This result is consistent with hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between enforcement, disclosure and transparency and corporate governance 
system, shareholders’ rights have a positive significant correlation of 0.14 with corporate 
governance system. This also supports the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
shareholders rights and corporate governance system.  
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Table 10: Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance in Ghanaian firms.  
Variables Code  corp 
gov. 
systm
. (1) 
Regulator
y 
Framewor
k 
(2) 
Enforceme
nt 
 
(3) 
Disc. 
& 
Trpy 
 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rght 
(5) 
Owns
h 
Con. 
(6) 
1 Corporate 
gov. Sytm 
TCg(Q8-
11) 
1      
2.Regulatory 
framework 
Trfw(Q12-
16) 
0.52*
* 
1     
3.Enforcemen
t 
Tenfm(Q1
7-19) 
0.64*
* 
0.50** 1    
4.Disclosure 
and Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-
23) 
0.54*
* 
0.53** 059** 1   
5.Shareholder
s’ rights 
Tshrt(Q24-
27) 
0.23*
* 
0.23** 0.34** 0.26*
* 
1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28-
30) 
-
0.42*
* 
-0.41** -0.65** -
0.52*
* 
-
0.22*
* 
1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristic of corporate governance of 
firms in Ghana. 
In Table 10 illustrates the significant correlation of firm at each country, in Ghana firms there 
is evidence that regulatory framework has a positive significant correlation of 0.52, 
shareholders rights 0.23, enforcement has a positive significant correlation of 0.64 and 
disclosure also has positive significant correlation of 0.54 with corporate governance system. 
However, ownership concentration has a negative significant correlation of -0.42 with 
corporate governance system. These results are consistent with the hypothesis of the study 
respectively. 
Table 11: Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of  corporate 
governance in Nigeria firms.  
Variables Code  
corp.gov
. 
systm(1) 
Regulat
ory 
Framew
ork 
(2) 
Enforcement 
 
(3) 
Disc. &  
Trpy 
 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rght 
(5) 
Owns
h 
Con. 
(6) 
1 Corporate gov. 
Sytm 
TCg(Q8-11) 1      
2.Regulatory    
framework 
Trfw(Q12-16) -0.16** 1     
3.Enforcement Tenfm(Q17-19) -0.09 0.44** 1    
4.Disclosure and 
Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-23) -0.07 0.56** 0.58** 1   
5.Shareholders’ 
rights 
Tshrt(Q24-27) -0.14* 0.53** 0.45** 0.58** 1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28-30) 0.18** -0.30** -0.33** -0.35** -
0.42*
* 
1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
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*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristics of corporate governance 
of firms in Nigeria. 
Table 11 provides the significant correlation of firm for firms in Nigeria and there is evidence 
that regulatory framework has a negative significant correlation of -0.16, and shareholders 
rights have a negative significant correlation of -0.14, with corporate governance system. 
In addition, ownership concentration has a positive significant correlation of 0.18 with 
corporate governance system. However, in Nigeria firms, the regulatory framework has a 
negative significant correlation of -0.16, while enforcement is not significant. This result 
implies that regulatory framework of Nigeria corporate governance is weak and this may 
likely be due to weak legal system that can promote sound regulatory framework and 
enforcement policy. In addition, lack of implementation of listing rules and corporate codes 
conduct for firms is also common in Nigeria.  
 
The institutional bodies such as Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Insurance 
Commission (NICOM), Nigeria Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC) that are established to implement the regulatory framework and 
enforcement of corporate governance practices may be incompetent, and officers responsible 
to carried out their duties  may be corrupt. As a result of the above, this will not promote 
sound corporate governance practices of firms in Nigeria. 
Table 12:Correlation analysis on variables of institutional characteristic of corporate 
governance in South Africa firms.  
Variables Code corp.go
v. systm  
(1) 
 
Regulator
y 
Framewor
k 
(2) 
Enforceme
nt 
 
(3) 
 Disc. 
&  
Trpy 
 
(4) 
Shd. 
Rgh
t 
(5) 
 
Owns
h 
Con. 
(6) 
1 Corporate 
gov. Sytm 
TCg(Q8-
11) 
1      
2.Regulatory 
framework 
Trfw(Q12-
16) 
0.33** 1     
3.Enforcemen
t 
Tenfm(Q1
7-19) 
0.30* 0.10 1    
4.Disclosure 
and Transp. 
Tdis(Q20-
23) 
0.21 0.53** 0.24* 1   
5.Shareholder
s’ rights 
Tshrt(Q24-
27) 
0.02 0.20** 0.13 0.36*
* 
1  
6. Ownership 
concentration 
Towc(Q28
-30) 
0.15 -0.19 0.05 -0.21 -
0.23 
1 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Results of correlation analysis on institutional characteristic of corporate governance of 
firms in South Africa. 
In Table 12 shows the correlation analysis of corporate governance structures for firms in 
South Africa. The result indicates that regulatory framework has a positive significant 
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correlation of 0.33, and enforcement with positive significant correlation of 0.30. This 
suggests that in South Africa have better functioning legal system and better implementation 
of regulatory and enforcement policy of corporate governance.  In conclusion  the finding of 
this study suggest  that at each country,   firms in  Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa,  
regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate governance practices is a vital 
mechanism  for effective’s corporate governance practices. Other mechanisms such as 
disclosure and transparency, shareholders rights and ownership concentration will improve 
once there are sound regulatory and enforcement implementation policy for such country. 
 
Results of the data analysis on effect of institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance and corporate governance system 
This Chapter examines key challenges of corporate governance of listed firms, exploring 
empirical evidence from listed firms. The key objectives include identification and examine 
the effect of the important components of corporate governance such as regulatory 
framework, enforcement, transparency and disclosure, and level of concentration.   
The Table below describes the sections, statements and variables on institutional 
characteristics of corporate governance as it indicate in the survey questionnaire. 
Table 13:Show the statements and variables  for institutional characteristics of 
corporate governance practices 
 
 Sections                        Statements          Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 B: Effective 
corporate governance 
system     
 
 
 
 
 
Q8.There are adequate and effective rules and  
laws that promote corporate governance of firms 
in my country 
 
 
Rules and laws 
Q9. The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
agencies have the power, resources and authority 
to enforce compliance with laws and regulations 
and guidelines on corporate governance in my 
country of operation 
 
 Agencies power 
 
Q10. A good legal system in my country of 
operation helps to improve the corporate 
governance of firms 
 
  Legal system 
Q11.A well organised legislature and sound 
regulatory and supervisory agencies in place 
promote corporate governance 
 
Agencies organ  
 
      
 
   C:  Regulatory 
framework of 
corporate governance    
Q12.Stock markets listing rules and corporate 
code of conduct for firms are often abused or 
ignored 
 Stock market 
 
Q13.The rules and regulation for appointing and 
removal of auditors are frequently violated 
Auditor 
appointment 
Q14. Rules and regulations for a formal and 
transparent board nomination and election process 
of firms are often ignored. 
Board 
nomination 
Q15.Rules and regulation for disclosure and 
communication are not followed 
Disclosure 
Q16.Rules and regulations regarding the required 
independent status of board members are often 
violated 
Independent 
board 
 
 
  D: Enforcement of 
Q17. There is sufficient investigation of apparent 
non-compliance with laws/regulations by 
 
Non-compliance 
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corporate governance 
practices        
enforcement agency. 
Q18. There is appropriate legal protection of 
investors and creditors from fraud perpetrated by 
managers and controlling shareholders within 
firms. 
 
Investor 
protection 
Q19.There are appropriate mechanism for 
investigating the illegal or inappropriate treatment 
of minority shareholders within firms 
 
Minority 
shareholder 
 
 
  E:Transparency and 
disclosure of 
corporate governance          
Q20.Generally in the firm your country, insider 
trading laws, rules, and regulations are followed 
Insider trading 
Q21.There is equal access to information for all 
shareholders in firm 
Information 
access 
Q22.There is confidence in the autonomy and 
independence of auditors for firms within your 
country 
Auditor 
Independence 
Q23.There are transparency in mergers and 
acquisition of firms in your country 
Merger & 
Acquisition 
        
 
   F: Shareholder 
rights      
 
             
             
Q24.The basic shareholders rights in your firm are 
not protected 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
Q25.Minority shareholders rights of your firm are 
often violated 
Shareholder 
violation 
Q26.Minority shareholders are often not allowed 
to express their view at general meeting of firm in 
your country 
 
Shareholder 
meeting 
Q27. Shareholders are not allowed to speak at 
company meeting only if they are known to agree 
with the board of directors. 
 
Shareholder 
alignment 
 
Section Statements Variables 
 
 
    G: Ownership 
concentration       
 
 
           
 
Q28.The firms in your country have a variety 
of composition of ownership 
 
Ownership 
composition 
Q29.There is large concentration of 
ownership (few shareholders having majority 
of shares) in firms in your country 
 
Large 
concentration 
Q30.Preferential treatment is often given to 
large shareholders of firms in your country 
 
Preferential 
treatment 
 
Results of the effect of institutional characteristics of corporate governance and the 
corporate system.  
This section provides empirical evidences on institutional characteristics of corporate 
governance and corporate governance system. Below are the model estimate and the Table 
showing results of the data analysis. 
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Table 14: Showing OLS estimate of corporate governance system on institutional 
characteristics of  corporate governance  
 Dependent variable: Total effective corporate governance system. 
Total_cg = β0 +β1(Trfw_C) + β2 (Tenfm_D) + β3(Tdis_E) + β4(Tshrt_F) + β5(Towc_G) 
+β6(RG) + β7(RN) + μi    
  All countries 
with 
   
 
Variables 
All 
observation 
for the 
countries 
Ghana and 
Nigeria as 
dummy  
Ghana Nigeria South 
Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 6.18** 
0.93 
(6.64) 
15..08** 
1.12 
(13.43) 
7.72** 
1.45 
(5.31) 
12.87** 
1.35 
(9.54) 
10.56** 
2.41 
(4.38) 
 
Regulatory 
framework 
 
0.05* 
0.03 
(1.87) 
-0.02 
0.03 
(-0.07) 
0.14** 
0.04 
(3.01) 
-0.07* 
0.03 
(-1.10) 
 
0.15** 
0.06 
(2.56) 
 
Enforcement 
 
0.42** 
0.04 
(9.56) 
 
 
0.16** 
0.05 
(3.52) 
0.31** 
0.07 
(4.71) 
-0.12 
0.05 
(-0.31) 
 
0.32* 
0.14 
(2.32) 
Disclosure & 
transparency 
 
0.15** 
0.04 
(4.53) 
0.07* 
0.03 
(2.05) 
0.06 
0.05 
(1.18) 
0.06 
0.05 
(1.22) 
0.01 
0.08 
(0.18) 
Shareholders’ 
rights 
 
-0.04 
0.03 
(-1.59) 
-0.02 
0.02 
(-0.83) 
-0.01 
0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.05 
0.07 
(-0.82) 
-0.05 
0.11 
(-0.41) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
0.24** 
0.06 
(4.25) 
0.05 
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.03 
0.08 
(0.43) 
0.14* 
0.08 
(1.90) 
0.14 
0.09 
(1.65) 
Regulators  0.57** 
0.19 
(3.00) 
   
Ghana  -4.34** 
0.35 
(-12.78) 
   
Nigeria  -3.36** 
0.34 
(-9.89) 
   
R-square 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.05 0.22 
F-statistic 44.59 62.54 29.62 3.19 3.68 
No of 
observation 
541 541 150 320 71 
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The dependent variable is indicated as total effective corporate governance system which is 
the addition of all the items or variable under section B of the survey questionnaire. The 
Independent variables are regulatory framework is shown as total regulatory framework 
which is the addition of all items or variables under section C of the survey questionnaire, 
enforcement is illustrated as total enforcement which is the addition of all the items or 
variable under section D of the survey questionnaire, transparency and disclosure is shown as 
total disclosure and transparency which is the addition of all items or variable within section 
E of the survey questionnaire, Total shareholders’ rights  is the addition of all items under 
shareholders rights in section F, and  ownership concentration is the total items or variable 
under section G of the survey questionnaire. 
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is Regulatory bodies and it is located in Ghana, 
Nigeria (reference category being South Africa there is a test for outliers in order to examine 
the robustness of the samples.  
 
The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the middle numbers are the 
standard error and Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. 
 F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent  level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
 
Table 14 columns 2 illustrate the regression result for all the countries together; there is 
evidence of positive significant relationship between enforcement and corporate governance 
system with coefficient of 0.16. Also, disclosure and transparency has a positive significant 
coefficient of 0.07 relationships with corporate governance system. Moreover, we find that 
firms in Ghana and Nigeria are negatively significant relation with corporate governance 
system. However, firms in South Africa that is used as a reference category have a positive 
significant relation with corporate governance system. This finding suggests that South 
African firms seem to have better corporate governance system than firms in Ghana and 
Nigeria. This may be due to the past reforms carried out by South Africa government on 
corporate governance practices of firms such as the King Reports of corporate governance 
(1994, 2002 and 2010). The Reports followed the corporate governance international 
standard such as Cadbury report of UK and OECD guideline on corporate governance 
practices. 
  
Furthermore, Table 14 columns 3, and 5 illustrate the OLS estimate at country level for firms 
in Ghana, and South Africa, as evidence in each country. We find that regulatory framework 
and enforcement have a positive significant relation with corporate governance.  
In Column 4 for Nigerian firms the result shows that regulatory framework has negative 
significant relation with corporate governance system. This result implies that Nigerian 
corporate governance may have a   weak regulatory framework that can promote sound 
corporate governance. In addition, this finding reveals that in Nigeria there may be a lack of 
enforcement of corporate governance. Also in Nigerian firms ownership is concentrated as a 
result of lack of enforcement of corporate governance. 
 
In Table 14 Column 4 in Nigeria, there is evidence of low value of R-square. The reason for 
this value there may be other factors that can affect corporate governance system which are 
not mention in this study.  
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 Effect of institutional characteristics on rules and laws of corporate governance 
This section reports the empirical evidences on effect of institutional characteristics on   rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance practices of firms for all the countries together. 
Below are the models estimate and the results of data analysis on Table 4.2.  
The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is as 
follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) +  β2(Dis_Com15)  + β3(Ind_Bod16) β4(G) + β5(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) β4(G) + 
β5(N) + μi   
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + 
β4(MA_23)+ β5(G) + β6(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) +β4(G) + β5(N) + μi  
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   + β3(G) + β4(N) + μi 
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Table 15: OLS estimate on sub-variable of institutional characteristics on rules and laws in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone countries  
Dependent variable: rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice (Q8) 
 Regulatory 
framework   
(Section C) 
 
          ( 1) 
 
                    Enforcement (Section D) 
                            (2) 
 
Disclosure & Transparency (Section E) 
                      (3) 
 
Shareholders’ rights  
        (Section F) 
       
             ( 4) 
Ownership 
concentration 
 
(Section G) 
      ( 5) 
     
Variable Disclosu
re (Q15) 
 (1a) 
Independe
nt board 
(Q16) (1b) 
Non-compliance 
(Q17)  
      (2a) 
Investor 
protection      
(Q18) 
      (2b) 
Minority 
Shareholder 
(Q19)   (2c) 
Insider 
Trading 
(Q20) (3a) 
Information  
Access 
(Q21) 
       ( 3b) 
Auditor 
Independent 
(Q22) 
 ( 3c) 
Shareholder 
rights (Q24) 
 
      (4a) 
shareholder 
alignment 
(Q27) 
 ( 4b) 
Preferential 
Treatment  
      (Q30) 
      ( 5a) 
 0.09* 
0.05 
(1.89 
0.19** 
0.04 
(4.32) 
0.11** 
0.03 
(3.43) 
0.09* 
0.04 
(2.10) 
0.22** 
0.40 
(5.50) 
0.12** 
0.04 
(2.92) 
0.20** 
0.40 
(5.01) 
-0.10** 
0.03 
(-3.05) 
0.10* 
0.05 
(2.34) 
-0.11* 
0.04 
(-2.39) 
-0.18** 
0.05 
(-3.77) 
Ghana -1.87** 
0.13 
(-14.04) 
-1.63** 
0.14 
(-12.01) 
-1.73** 
0.13 
(-12.84) 
-2.13** 
0.12 
(-17.31) 
-2.26** 
0.12 
(-19.44) 
Nigeria -2.16** 
0.13 
(-16.19) 
-2.08** 
0.13 
(-16.63) 
-2.09** 
0.13 
(-16.47) 
-2.29** 
0.13 
(-17.46) 
-2.48** 
0.11 
(-23.44) 
R-square 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.53 
F-stat. 88.70  138.46 112.76 95.16 119.82 
No of 
observati
on 
541  541 541 541 541 
No of 
countries 
3  3 3 3 3 
 
The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice (Rules_cg) The Independent variables are 
regulatory framework such as Disclosure (Q15)  
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Independent board (Q16), Enforcement such as Non-Compliance (Q17),Investor protection (Q18) and Minority shareholders (Q19).Disclosure 
and transparency such as Insider trading (Q20), information access (Q21), and Auditor independent (Q22). Shareholders’ rights (Q24) and 
Shareholders’ alignment with board of directors (Q27). Ownership concentration such as preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30).  
Countries dummies indicating if the sample is located in Ghana, Nigeria (reference category being South Africa. 
 There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the 
middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
  *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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Table 15 indicate the estimate result for each sub-variable of regulatory framework, 
enforcement, disclosure and transparency, shareholders’ rights, and ownership concentration 
on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice.  
 
Table 15 Column 1 (1a and 1b) the OLS estimate indicates that regulatory framework such as 
rules and regulatory for disclosure and communication and required independent status of 
board members (disclosure Q15) and (independent board Q16) respectively have significant 
positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. In Table 15 
Column 2 (2a, 2b, and 2c), we find that sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance 
with rules and regulations non-compliance (Q17) Investor protection (Q18) and minority 
shareholder (Q19). These sub-variables have a positive effect on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practice. This result suggest that non-compliance, legal protection of 
investors and mechanism of investing inappropriate treatment of minority shareholders matter 
to improve rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices.   
 
Table 15 Column 3 (3a, 3b and 3c)  provide the estimate of insider trading laws (Q20), and 
equal access of information for all shareholders (Q21) these two sub-variables have a positive 
effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practices. This implies that the 
insider trading rules, laws and regulation, in addition to equal accesses of information for all 
shareholders increase the quality of rules and laws that promote corporate governance 
practices in the region. However, confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors 
(Q22) has a negative significant relationship with rules and laws that promote corporate 
governance practice. This finding suggests that confidence in autonomy and independence of 
auditors may inhibit rules and laws that promote corporate governance and this because of 
corrupt practices among the auditors.  
 
In Table 15 Column 4 (4a and 4b) we find that basic rights protections of shareholders (Q24) 
has a significant positive relationship on of rules and laws. This result indicates that when the 
basic shareholders rights are protected corporate governance practice seem to be improving 
because shareholders may be able to exercise their own rights in the firms they invested in; 
this can allow them to get their return and invest more to the company. As a result, this can 
lead to effective corporate governance practices. Also, when shareholders are allowed to 
speak at company meeting only if they are to agree with board of directors (Shareholder 
alignment Q27) have a negative impact on rules and laws. This evidence suggests that this 
may adversely affect the corporate governance practice by not allowing shareholders to 
express their feeling or opinion at the meeting. In Column 5 sub-variable under ownership 
concentration which is preferential treatment for larger shareholder (Q30) have negative 
significant effect on corporate governance across countries in the region.  
 
Results of the effect of institutional characteristic on corporate governance based on 
each country  
This section presents the empirical evidences on effect of institutional characteristics on rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance practices of firms for each of the country. Below 
are the models estimate and the results of data analysis on Table 4.3.  
 The Model estimate on regulatory framework of corporate governance in section C is as 
follow below; 
1. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Stk_Mkt12) + β2(Bod_Nom14) + β3(Dis_Com15)  + β4(Ind_Bod16) + 
μi  
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The Model estimate on enforcement of corporate governance in section D is as follow 
bellow; 
2. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Non_compl17) +  β2(Invtr_Prot18)    + β3(Mino_Shdt19) + μi  
The Model estimate on disclosure and transparency in section E is as follow bellow; 
3. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Insd_Trad20) +  β2(Inform_Accf21)   + β3(Aud_Indpend22) + 
β4(MA_23+ μi  
The Model estimate on shareholder rights in section F is as follow bellow; 
4. Rule_cg= β0 +  β1(Shd_rigt24) +  β2(Shd_Violt25)   + β3(Shd_Allg27) + μi  
The Model estimate on ownership concentration in section G is as follow bellow; 
5. Rules_cg= β0 +  β1(Larg_Con29) +  β2(Pref_Treat30)   +  μi  
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Table 16: showing OLS estimate on institutional characteristics and rules and laws of corporate governance of in each country  
Dependent Variable: Rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice 
 Regulatory framework  (Section C) 
(1) 
   Enforcement  (Section D) 
(2) 
  Disclosure & Transparency  (Section E) 
(3) 
Shareholders’ rights 
      (Section  F) 
(4) 
Ownership 
concentration 
(Section G) 
(5) 
 Stock 
Mkt 
  (Q12) 
    
( 1a) 
Board  
Nomina
tion 
(Q14)  
(1b) 
Disclos
ure 
(Q15) 
 
 
(1c) 
Indepen
dent  
Board  
(Q16) 
 ( 1d) 
Non- 
Comp
liance 
(Q17) 
(2a) 
Investor 
Protectio
n 
(Q18) 
 
  ( 2b) 
Minority 
Sharehol
der (Q19) 
 
 ( 2c) 
Insider 
trading 
(20) 
 
     (3a) 
Informati
on access  
 (Q21) 
 
 (3b) 
Auditor 
independ
ent (Q22) 
 
   ( 3c) 
Merger 
& 
Acquisi
tion 
(Q23) 
 ( 3d) 
Shareholde
r 
Rights 
(Q24) 
     
       
 (4a) 
 
Sharehol
der 
violation 
(Q25) 
 
 (4b) 
Large 
Concentr
ation 
(Q29) 
 
   ( 5a) 
Prefere
ntial 
Treatm
ent 
(Q30) 
(5b) 
Ghana -0.01 
0.06 
(-0.21) 
0.23** 
0.08 
(2.72) 
0.33* 
0.08 
(4.26) 
-0.24** 
0.08 
(-2.94) 
0.29*
* 
0.08 
(3.58) 
0.39** 
0.08 
(4.97) 
0.19* 
0.08 
(2.35) 
0.15* 
0.07 
(2.24) 
0.46** 
0.07 
(6.68) 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.14) 
0.17* 
0.08 
(2.17) 
0.21* 
0.11 
(2.04) 
0.06 
0.12 
(0.48) 
-0.21 
0.12 
(-1.81) 
-0.44** 
0.09 
(-4.83) 
R-square 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.15 0.15 0.31 0.31 
F-stat 16.85 16.85 16.85 16.85 73.79 73.79 73.79 37.54 37.54 37.54 37.54 6.41 6.41 21.33 21.33 
Nigeria 0.08* 
0.04 
(1.91) 
0.03 
0.06 
(0.50) 
 
-0.04 
0.06 
(-0.79) 
-0.10* 
0.05 
(-2.28) 
-0.12* 
0.04 
(-
2.69) 
0.09 
0.05 
(1.82) 
-0.01 
0.05 
(-2.14) 
-0.06 
0.05 
(-1.17) 
-0.03 
0.05 
(-0.68) 
0.08 
0.04 
(1.77) 
0.01 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.07 
0.05 
(1.32) 
-0.12* 
0.06 
(-2.06) 
0.10* 
0.05 
(1.91) 
-0.04 
0.05 
(-0.83) 
R-square   0.3   0.3   0.3   0.3 025 0.25 0.25 37.54 37.54 37.54 37.54 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 
F-stat 7.14 7.14 7.14 7.14 2.74 2.74 2.74 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.39 1.39 1.24 1.24 
South 
Africa 
-0.01 
0.09 
(-0.15) 
0.15 
0.12 
(1.30) 
0.13 
0.09 
(1.41) 
-0.03 
0.09 
(-0.33) 
0.01 
0.07 
(0.09) 
 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.60) 
0.20* 
0.09 
(2.26) 
0.04 
0.13 
(0.31) 
0.02 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.17* 
0.09 
(1.97) 
0.06 
0.10 
(0.54) 
-0.02 
0.11 
(-0.19) 
0.10 
0.10 
(0.92) 
0.01 
0.11 
(0.59) 
 
-0.09 
0.10 
(-0.88) 
R-square  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.4 0.4 
F-stat  2.19  2.19  2.19  2.19 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Total No. 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 541 
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 The dependent variable is indicated as rules and laws (Q8). The Independent variables are regulatory framework such as stock market 
listing rules (Q12).Board nomination 
 (Q14) Disclosure (Q15), Independent board (Q16). Enforcement such as Non-compliance (Q17), investors protection (Q18) and Minority 
shareholders (Q19) Disclosure and transparency such as Insider trading (Q20), information access (Q21), and Auditor independent (Q22) 
Shareholders’ rights such as protection of shareholders’ rights (Q24) and Shareholders’ alignment with board of directors (Q27).Ownership 
concentration such as large concentration (Q29) preferential treatment of large shareholders (Q30).  
There is a test for outliers in order to examine the robustness of the samples. The numbers with significant level are coefficient value, while the 
middle numbers are the standard error and Numbers in the parentheses refer to t-statistics. F-Statistic is significant at 1% and 5% critical value 
**significant at 1 percent level. 
*significant at 5 percent level.  
           *Heteroskedasticity is corrected using White-adjusted standard errors. 
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At each country level Table 16 column 1b and 1c show that it is only firms in Ghana that 
disclosure (Q15) has a positive significant relationship on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practices. In addition, Independents board (Q16) also has a positive 
significant association on rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. 
Moreover, board nomination (Q14) enhances the promotion of rules and laws on corporate 
governance practice in Ghanaian firms. This implies that for Ghanaian firms the rules and 
regulation for disclosure and communication are better follow. This seem to  allow the 
shareholders and other stakeholders to have information about what is going on within their 
firms; and other matters that are related to disclosure and disseminating of information to the 
potential shareholders.  
 
In Nigeria firms stock market listing rules (Q12) has positive significant relation with on 
rules and laws that promote corporate governance practice. This finding shows what is 
happening in Nigerian capital markets presently which result to weak implementation of rules 
and regulation guiding the capital markets. As a result, most investors do not have confident 
to invest in Nigerian Capital Markets. 
 
In Nigerian firms the rules and regulation required for independent board member (Q16) is 
negatively significant on rules and laws. However, the rules and regulation regarding the 
required independent status of board seem to deter corporate governance system. This is may 
be  due to lack of implementation by the regulatory agencies of corporate governance such  as 
Securities Exchange Commission in Nigeria (SEC) that stipulated that a minimum of five 
members with a majority of non-executive directors; and not more than two of the same 
family should sit at the same time on the board of a  firm. In addition, there should not be 
cross membership of the boards of two or more companies, to avoid conflict of interest and 
misappropriate of corporate opportunity.  
 
Moreover, in Table 16 Column 2 (2a, 2b and 2c), we find that all enforcement of corporate 
governance sub-variables in Ghanaian firms have a positive significant relationship on rules 
and laws guiding promotion of corporate governance practice. This result suggests that 
Ghana enforcement policy and the enforcement agency may improve corporate governance 
system in terms of rules and laws. There are Institutional bodies such as Ghana Securities 
Exchange Commission, Bank of Ghana, Institute of Directors and Registered General 
Department (RGD). All these bodies are involved in implementation so as to ensure that 
enforcement of good corporate governance practices of firms are adopted in Ghana. They 
carry out their function through seminars, public lecture, and training to different categories 
of stakeholders of corporate governance in Ghana.   
 
In South African firms’ mechanism for investigating the illegal or inappropriate treatment of 
minority shareholders (Q19) has a positive effect on rules and laws guiding promotion of 
corporate governance practice. This may be due to compliance of the King Report Code of 
corporate governance which strengthened rules and laws on corporate governance in South 
Africa. The structure, strategy and governance of capital markets in South Africa have also 
been overhauled. The self regulation via Johannesburg Stock Exchange have also introduced 
stringent corporate governance requirement so that implementation of enforcement policy can 
be improve corporate governance system.      
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Furthermore, there is evidence within Nigerian firms’ that enforcement of corporate 
governance variable such as sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance with 
laws/regulations (Q17) has a negative impact on rules and laws guiding promotion of 
corporate governance practice.  
 
This result indicates that in Nigerian firms the degree of investigation on non-compliance 
with laws or regulations by enforcement agency seem to be  very weak to move the corporate 
governance system forward in terms of rules and regulation. This may be due to lack of 
implementation of enforcement policy of non-compliance with laws and regulation by 
institutional bodies such Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN), National Insurance Commission (NICOM), and Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC). In addition, corruption by the officers of these institutional bodies may also make it 
difficult for them to carry out their proper duties of enforcing the rules and laws.  
 
Based on results within countries level in Table 16 Column 3 (3a, 3b 3c and 3d) which shows 
the estimate for sub-variables under disclosure of corporate governance and on rules and laws 
guiding promotion of corporate governance practice.  Thus, in Ghana firm there is evidence 
of positive effect of insider trading laws (Q20) and positive effect of equal access of 
information for all shareholders in firms on rules and laws .There is also positive effect of 
Transparency in the merger and acquisition of firms (Q21) on rules and laws that promote 
corporate governance practice. This results indicate that the quality of disclosure and 
transparency in term of insiders trading laws, equal access to information to all shareholders 
and transparency in the merger and acquisition for Ghanaian firms have enhance the 
promotion of rules and laws that guide corporate governance practice in Ghanaian firms.  
 
In South African firms, confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors (Q22) has 
a significant positive relationship with rules and laws guiding promotion of corporate 
governance practice. This evidence is because of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
that carried out innovation in disclosure and transparency aimed at exposing conflict of 
interest among the stakeholders of corporate governance. This action is carried out by 
compulsory requirement for listed firms to disclose their compliance with King Reports on 
issue of disclosure and transparency that indicate the level of confidence in the autonomy and 
independence of auditor.  
  
Moreover, in Table 16 Columns 4a and 4b. We find that shareholders rights such as basic 
rights to protection of shareholders are not protected (Q24) has a positive effect on rules and 
laws guiding promotion of corporate governance practice of firms in Ghana. This suggests 
that Ghanaian firms have better basic shareholder protections and this can improve corporate 
governance practice. However, in Nigerian firms the degree of violation of minority 
shareholder rights (Q25) has a negative influence on rules and laws guiding promotion of 
corporate governance practice. This implies that minority shareholder rights violations are 
more prominent within Nigerian firms; this may be due to lack of implementation of 
enforcement policy and law regarding to minority shareholders rights in Nigerian firms. 
 
Furthermore, conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders as well as those 
between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance 
literature. With the exception of the US and the UK, ownership concentration is commonly 
high in all parts of the world. As a result Table 15 and 16 Column 5a and 5b reveals that in 
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Nigerian firms’ larger concentration of ownership (Q29) have a significant negative 
relationship with rules and laws that guide promotion of corporate governance practice. This 
finding suggests that when there is large concentrated ownership the controlling owner may 
be unwilling to dilute their ownership. In addition, in Ghanaian firms, preferential treatment 
to large shareholders (Q30) has a significant negative relationship with rules and laws that 
guide promotion of corporate governance practice. This result may affect effective corporate 
governance practice in Ghanaian firms because the minority shareholders may not be able to 
express their own on decision taken by management of firms. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The findings from this study make a contribution to the literature that enforcement, disclosure 
and transparency are likely to improve corporate governance system in all the countries 
together. In addition, there is a positive significant relationship between the regulatory 
framework and enforcement of corporate governance in each country such as Ghana and 
South Africa.  
 
Another contribution of this study is that in Nigerian firms, regulatory framework has a 
significant negative effect on corporate governance system. This finding seems to be due to a 
lack of proper implementation of regulatory framework of corporate governance by the 
institutional bodies such as Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). Moreover, lack of proper 
implementation may possibly be as a result of corruption among the officials of institutional 
bodies. Furthermore, there are laws in the books and laws in practice, however in Nigeria 
there are laws in the book for regulatory framework and enforcement policy of corporate 
governance but there are no laws in practice to execute those rules and regulation and 
enforcement of corporate governance practices. The institutional bodies and corporate 
governance system may look good on papers but when they are compromised with 
corruption, lack of implementation and incompetence the result is likely weak corporate 
governance practices among firms in Nigeria. 
 
We find that in Nigerian and Ghanaian firms’ large concentration of ownership and 
preferential treatment to large shareholders may have influence on rules and laws of 
corporate governance practices. The implication is that ownership concentration is prevalent 
in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone firms.  
 
In a situation of using firms in Nigeria and Ghana as dummy variables, each country has a 
negative significant relationship on corporate governance system. However, South African 
firms that serve as reference category can be regarded as positively significant on corporate 
governance system. This result suggests that corporate governance practice in Ghanaian and 
Nigerian firms may be relatively weak when compared with South African firms. This 
finding suggests that in Ghanaian and Nigerian firms, there is a need for improvement of 
corporate governance practice for those countries. However, the improvements of corporate 
governance practices in South African firms have been found to be important because of 
King Report 1994, and King Report of 2002. The primary objective of the Reports is to 
promote the highest standard of corporate governance in South Africa. 
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The sub-variables of regulatory and enforcement of corporate governance may be better in 
Ghanaian than Nigerian firms. In particular, the rules and regulation for formal transparency 
in board nomination, election process, disclosure and communication these sub-variables 
have significant positive effect on rules and laws that promote corporate governance in 
Ghana. Also, enforcement sub-variables such as investigation of apparent compliance with 
rules and regulation by enforcement agency, investors’ protection and mechanisms for 
investigating the illegal treatment of minority shareholders have a positive impact on rules 
and laws that promote corporate governance in Ghana. 
 
 In Nigerian firms, the degree of investigation on non-compliance with laws or regulations by 
enforcement agency seem to be very weak to move the corporate governance system forward 
in terms of rules and laws that promote corporate governance. Also disclosure and 
transparency in Ghanaian firms in terms of insider trading, equal access to information and 
merger and acquisition may promote rules and laws on corporate governance. In South 
African firms the confidentiality and autonomy of auditors may be better to enhance sound 
corporate governance systems. 
 
 The basic shareholders rights are expected in promote effective corporate governance system 
firms in Ghana than firms in Nigeria. This result indicates that firms in Ghana have better 
basic shareholder protections. This is likely due to the reason for some foreign investors 
within West Africa Sub-region moving to Ghana in recent times. In Nigerian firms, the 
violations of the rights of minority shareholders hinder corporate governance system. There is 
evidence to show that shareholders are allowed to speak at company meeting only if they are 
known to agree with boards of directors. Consequently, this may deters corporate governance 
system in Nigerian firms.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 
 
Based on the findings which are the perception or opinion of the respondents from the finding 
on this study, we recommend that there is need for general reform of corporate governance of 
firms in Nigeria by issue only one corporate governance code of best practices for each 
industry such as financial or non-financial. This should follow the international standard both 
in context and the implementation of the codes. The corporate governance code should be 
reviewed as happened in UK Financial Reporting Council in 2012, and to be tailored towards 
international corporate governance standard such as Cadbury Report 1992 and King Report 
(1994, 2002). 
 
The establishment of Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria FRC Act 2011 is significant; 
under this Act there is section four which provide for a directorate of corporate governance 
with objectives and function toward effective corporate governance practices of firms. As a 
result, this Act should be well implemented without any interference from politicians. Also, 
there should be prudent monitoring of law and stringent penalties with requirements of 
corporate governance rules, regulatory framework and enforcement policy under this FRC 
2011 Act. Therefore, any official of the institutional bodies or any stakeholders found guilty 
of the offence under this Act should be punished in form of penalty. 
 
 In Ghana there is a need for Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in order to have more 
regulatory and supervisory bodies on corporate governance practices for financial and non-
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financial firms. The respondents from this study provide comments that the Ghana 
Companies law of 1963 Act 179 have been found to be outdated. There should be a reform of 
the Companies Act 179 which must include modern corporate code and law guiding Business 
Corporation. This must also include norms on international standard for corporate governance 
practices. Furthermore, the shareholders of firms in Sub-Saharan Africa Anglophone 
countries need strong shareholders’ activism through the establishment of shareholders 
association with aims and objectives of promoting the interest, welfare, enlightenment, and 
dissemination of information related to management of firms. 
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Survey Questionnaire 
Section A: Survey Questions 1-7 are related to your background. Please mark(X) only 
one option. 
1. Gender:    
2. Occupation: Legislator   Executive Director    
   Regulator    Non-Executive Director    
   Academician   Company Executive (CEO)   
   Individual investor  Company employee   
   Institutional investor iciary or Legal  
             Accountant/Auditor  Other 
(Specify)………….    
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3. Years of experience in your occupation:    ____ year 
4. Formal education: Diploma/Certificate   Bachelor Degree  
Master Degree   Doctoral Degree  
Professional c           
5. Your location: ____  
6. How do you rate your knowledge  on corporate governance of firms in your 
country 
Low    Medium   High         
7. Type of Firm:                     -  
Section B: Statements 8-11 relate to your views on effectiveness of corporate 
governance practice. Please rate the extent to which you agree with each 
statement (X) according to the scale below. Please this applies to all sections. 
1=strongly disagree  2=disagree  3=Undecided   4=Agree  5=strongly Agree 
 
8. There are adequate and effective rules and laws that promote the 
practice of good corporate governance of firms in my country of 
operation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. The supervisory, regulatory and enforcement agencies have the 
power, resources and authority to enforce compliance with laws 
and regulations and guidelines on corporate governance in my 
country of operation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.  A good legal system in my country of operation helps to improve 
the corporate governance of firms.  
1 2 3 4 5 
11.  A well-organized legislature and sound regulatory and supervisory 
agencies in place promote good corporate governance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section C: Statements 12-16 relate to your views on regulatory framework of 
corporate governance practice in your country.  
12. Stock markets listing rules and corporate codes of conduct for firms 
are often abused or ignored. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The rules and regulation for appointing and removal of auditors are 
frequently violated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Rules and regulations for a formal and transparent board nomination 
and election process of firms are often ignored. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15.  Rules and regulation for disclosure and communication are not often 
followed 
1 2 3 4 5 
16.  Rules and regulations regarding the required independent status of 
board members are often violated. 
1 2 3 4 5 
                     
Section D: Statements 17-19 relate to your views on enforcement of corporate 
governance practice.  
17. There is sufficient investigation of apparent non-compliance with 
laws/regulations by the enforcement agency. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18.  There is appropriate legal protection of investors and creditors 
from fraud perpetrated by managers and controlling 
shareholders within firms. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. There are appropriate mechanisms for investigating the illegal or 
inappropriate treatment of minority shareholders within firms. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section E: Statements 20-23 relate to your views on transparency and disclosure of 
corporate governance practice.  
20.  Generally, in firms in your country, insider trading laws, rules and 
regulations are followed.  
1 2 3 4 5 
21. There is equal access to information for all shareholders in  firms  1 2 3 4 5 
22. There is confidence in the autonomy and independence of auditors 
for firms within your country.  
1 2 3 4 5 
23.  There are transparency in  mergers and acquisitions of  firms in 
your country    
1 2 3 4 5 
          
Section F:        Statements 24-27 relate to your view on shareholders’ rights.  
 
24. The basic shareholders rights in your firm are not protected 1 2 3 4 5 
25. Minority shareholder rights of your firm are often violated  1 2 3 4 5 
26. Minority shareholders are often not allowed to express their view at 
general meetings of firms in your country.  
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Shareholders are allowed to speak at company meetings only if they 
are known to agree with the board of directors. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section G: Statements 28-30 relate to your views on ownership concentration.  
28. The firms in your country have a variety of  composition of ownership 1 2 3 4 5 
29. There is large concentration of ownership (few shareholders having 
majority of shares) in firms in your country.  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
30. Preferential treatment is often given to large shareholders of firms in 
your country 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
